The concept of sovereignty in contemporary continental political philosophy

The concept of sovereignty is one of the central concepts of modern political philosophy. However, faced with processes of economic globalization as well as legal and political universalism, contemporary political theory struggles to account for the exercise of state power in terms of the traditional understanding of sovereignty. This survey article reviews the most influential conceptualizations of sovereignty in contemporary continental political philosophy. These include Schmitt’s defense of sovereignty and Agamben’s rejection of sovereign politics as well as a number of theoretical attempts to account for the complexities of sovereignty and its adaptation to new political circumstances.

I. Introduction

The renewed interest in the concept of sovereignty in contemporary political philosophy should come as no surprise to observers of recent political developments. In its traditional meaning, inaugurated by early modern theorists of the state like Bodin and Hobbes, sovereignty names supreme, indivisible and absolute power within the bounded territory of a state. However, globalization, increased political and economic interdependence, the repercussions of a global War on Terror, and the exercise of what is traditionally seen as sovereign power by administrative officials undermine and simultaneously lead to a reassertion of state sovereignty. At the same time, nation states continue to invoke the principle of sovereignty and promote it as the only defense against the perceived dangers of terrorism, immigration, economic crises triggered by the unfettered forces of global capital and other threats attributed to porous borders. Given these conditions, many scholars contend that traditional conceptions of sovereignty developed by early modern theorists of the state are no longer adequate, while others invoke the modern theory of the state to theorize and even defend sovereignty. Despite the emergence of new and decisive hubs of power at lower echelons of the political system and new centers of decision-making beyond the state, these conceptions of sovereignty remain an important point of reference in contemporary political philosophy.

This article seeks to present a brief survey of the most important positions in these debates by way of discussion of paradigmatic figures in contemporary continental political philosophy. We will see that some authors have sharply criticized the decline of state
sovereignty and demanded a return to traditional sovereign politics (Section II), while others outright reject sovereignty, either as the arbitrary and violent positing of power as right or as the illegitimate foundation of an unjust legal and political order (Section III). Navigating between these two positions, others have called for a renewed engagement with and a rethinking of the early modern concept of sovereignty so as to account for its changing function in different historical, political and socio-economic contexts (Section IV). While the first two positions are outlined by way of a more detailed examination of their most paradigmatic representatives, Section IV presents a review of the most productive attempts to theorize contemporary manifestations of sovereignty.

II. In defense of sovereignty

After a first wave of Anglo-American reception of the work of Carl Schmitt in the 1980s, Schmitt has again come to take center stage in debates about sovereignty in the wake of 9/11, reinvigorated US-imperialism and a global War on Terror. Specifically, a certain strand of contemporary continental political philosophy seeks to mobilize for a critique of imperial universalism, humanitarian intervention and the normalization of emergency legislation. While some commentators have cautioned against an appropriation of Schmitt for critical political theory (Scheuerman 2006, Teschke 2011), some scholars have suggested including Schmitt in the canon of political philosophy (Odysseos and Petito 2007, Hooker 2009).

The point of contention in these debates is Schmitt’s fierce defense of sovereignty as the only remedy against the ills of liberalism. Without going into the details of Schmitt’s argument, he claims that the most serious and most fundamental problem of liberalism is its normativism, that is, the subjection of political authority to a set of norms which are derived through formalist jurisprudence. In other words, liberalism operates on the assumption that a system of general rules produces predictable and determinate decisions. Against liberal normativism, Schmitt insists that consistent normativism eclipses the fact that the liberal order itself cannot be derived from a norm. Against formalist jurisprudence, Schmitt claims that political practice shows that the application of a norm requires a moment of judicial decision in order to bring pure legal norms into the sphere of political facticity. The importance of decision is even more pronounced in emergency situations where the legal
order as a whole is suspended in order to ward off an existential threat to the political order itself. Schmitt therefore turns his attention to the personage with the power not only to decide on but also to defeat the enemy in a state of emergency, namely the sovereign.

“Sovereign,” Schmitt announces in “Political Theology” (1922), “is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt 2005, 5). Schmitt further maintains that the exception “is to be understood to refer to a general concept in the theory of the state, and not merely to a construct applied to any emergency decree or state of siege” (Schmitt 2005, 5). In short, the exception demonstrates a more general point about the extra-juridical nature of the political tout court. “The exception is more interesting than the rule,” Schmitt contends, because “the rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything” (Schmitt 2005, 15). It “confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception” (Schmitt 2005, 15). In short, the manifestation of sovereignty in an exception points to the extra-legal foundation of the legal order as a whole. The constitution of the political presupposes a sovereign decision that is prior to and, thus, superior to the norm. It is this existential primacy of the sovereign decision on friend and enemy that constitutes the political and guarantees its unity and primacy over other spheres such as religion or the economy.

The focus of Schmitt’s critique of liberal parliamentarism and the rule of law thus comes sharply into view. First, liberalism denies its foundation in a sovereign decision as the basis of every political order. Second, the denial of the essentially political nature of liberal regimes is reflected and advanced by the principle of pluralism underpinning liberal parliamentarism. Plurality of opinions of equal value leads to increased depoliticization by not only eroding the distinction between friend and enemy as the basis of politics but also by undermining the primacy of the political over economics and morality (Schmitt 1988 and 1996). For Schmitt, the liberal universalism promoted by the United States further extends these depoliticizing tendencies on a global scale (Schmitt 2003).

Schmitt is not entirely clear about why he thinks liberal depoliticization would be catastrophic. At times, he seems to argue that it fails to recognize the essentially political foundation of liberalism. In other places, it simply seems to go against Schmitt’s political existentialism. His perhaps most convincing objection to liberal depoliticization, however, is that it leads to the most horrendous forms of re-politicization through a moralization of previously political concepts. These concepts are then used to justify the most egregious forms of violence because, no longer bound by political considerations, one “simultaneously
degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed” (Schmitt 1996, 36).

Schmitt’s alternative is an affirmation of sovereignty within the bounds of an ethnically homogeneous state, which he fleshes out in terms of plebiscitary dictatorship and a qualitatively total state (Schmitt 1994 and 2008). To be sure, the aim of contemporary champions of Schmitt’s work is “definitely not to read Schmitt to attack liberal democracy, but to ask how it could be improved” (Mouffe 1999, 6). However, while neo-Schmittians see chances for such an improvement in an appropriation of Schmitt’s critique of liberalism, his theory of sovereignty and his agonistic concept of the political without having to accept his political commitments, there remains substantial doubt as to the chances of success of such a project. As Scheuerman has pointed out, if one accepts Schmitt’s argument that exceptional measures are unavoidable and subscribes to his conceptualization of these measures as necessarily extra-legal, there appears to be no possibility for effectively containing emergency powers by legal means. The consequence is a demand for equally non-legal checks on emergency power which not only opens the door for normalizing and “condoning massive executive-level illegality” but also jettisons democratic politics in favor of ideological manipulation and “yet another variety of executive-centered mass rule” (Scheuerman 2006, 72-74).

III. Politics without sovereignty

Although heavily influenced by Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben has gained a reputation as a radical critic of sovereignty. Agamben agrees with Schmitt that every order rests on a decision that posits power as right, but follows Walter Benjamin who argues that this founding act of violence is justified through a myth of origin (Benjamin 1997). Agamben believes that the political is grounded in nothing but arbitrary human action and can therefore be said to have no foundation at all. Given his definition of an act as sovereign “when it realizes itself by simply taking away its own potentiality not to be, letting itself be, giving itself to itself,” the arbitrary and groundless positing of the political thus appears as the sovereign act par excellence (Agamben 1998, 46). In order to cover over the lack of foundation and to bestow legitimacy on the political order, a myth of origin or, in Agamben’s words, “fiction of a beginning” is needed (Agamben 1991, 105). This fiction
takes the form of a nightmarish pre-political sphere which is supposedly overcome by the political order. Yet, Agamben maintains, “that which is excluded from the community is, in reality, that on which the entire life of the community is founded” (Agamben 1991, 105).

Agamben claims that “In Western politics, bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men” (Agamben 1998, 7). To substantiate this claim, Agamben draws a distinction between the ancient Greek conceptions of bios and zoē. According to Agamben’s reading of Aristotle, the good life in the polis (bios politikos) is predicated on the confinement of natural life in the oikos (zoē). Political life can only exist to the extent that natural life has been secured. At the same time, however, natural life becomes the subject of political decision whenever an individual faces corporal punishment for the transgression of the law. The conclusion Agamben draws is that bare life is not really excluded from the political sphere but is presupposed as its foundation.

Likewise, Agamben contends, Hobbes’ infamous state of nature is not a condition prior to civil society but one of political philosophy’s great sleights of hand to make us believe that only sovereignty can rescue us from the hardships of our natural condition. In fact, however, Agamben argues that it is sovereignty that conjures up this bellicose state of nature to justify itself. Because the sovereign decision establishing the political has to presuppose a natural state in distinction from which it can posit itself, the political does not replace nature but rather creates it in order to exclude itself from it. The original activity of sovereignty, Agamben concludes, is the creation of the idea of purely natural life which sovereignty subjects to the law in its act of self-constitution.

In stark contrast to Schmitt’s defense of sovereign decisionism and the neo-Schmittian invocation of agonistic politics, Agamben calls for a non-sovereign politics in which it is impossible to isolate something like bare life distinct from the political life of individuals. Agamben opposes sovereignty because it produces bare life as a life that is negatively defined by being deprived of political form. As such, bare life only appears in the political sphere as the object of the violence of sovereign power. Agamben further claims that the history of Western politics is such that “the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the markings of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction” (Agamben 1998, 9). This historical development
culminates in the Nazi concentration camp which becomes, for Agamben, the “new biopolitical nomos of the planet” (Agamben 1998, 176).

While most contemporary political theorists are concerned with the significance of Agamben’s account of sovereignty for analyzing the suspension of constitutional rights and the use of detention facilities for terrorist suspects in the War on Terror, an increasing number of scholars have turned to his rethinking of community in order to flesh out possibilities of political resistance and new forms of subjectivity. Agamben’s recent study of monasticism as a form of life in which monastic rule and cenobitic life are indistinguishable and, in fact, coincide, promises new and interesting insights into the possibility of a non-sovereign political community (Agamben 2011).

IV. The reality of sovereignty

IV.1 Sovereignty’s new points of application: Michel Foucault

Agamben’s analysis of sovereignty as the power producing the idea of a pure biological life of individuals is partly directed against the genealogy of modern power developed by Michel Foucault. Foucault certainly shares Agamben’s critical stance towards the traditional theory of sovereignty but while Agamben demands an abandonment of sovereignty tout court, Foucault provides a more nuanced evaluation of sovereignty.

Even though Foucault recognizes the limitations of the classical theory of sovereignty, he simultaneously acknowledges the continued importance of technologies of power traditionally attributed to sovereignty. As a consequence, Foucault does not reject sovereign power as such but discards the traditional theory of sovereignty because of its inadequacy to account for the actual workings of power. In contrast to Agamben’s and Schmitt’s concern with the sovereign decision, Foucault argues that an adequate understanding of power requires that one attempt “not to analyze power at the level of intentions or decisions, not to try to approach it from inside, and not to ask the question (which leads us, I think, into a labyrinth from which there is no way out): So who has power?” (Foucault 2004, 28). Moreover, contrary to Agamben’s meta-historical narrative of sovereignty as the inclusive exclusion of bare life, Foucault shifts the focus from an institutionalized, state-centered and repressive notion of sovereign power to the transformation and integration of sovereignty into a complex economy of power since the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The emergence of new forms of power over life demands new ways of analyzing power, Foucault suggests, so we must “abandon the model of Leviathan” and “study power outside … the field delineated by juridical sovereignty and the institution of the State” (Foucault 2004, 37).  

Relinquishing a conception of power solely in terms of State sovereignty does not mean, however, that sovereignty disappeared. On the contrary, sovereign power remained operative even though it had to change its points of application. Faced with the emergence of disciplinary power, a first displacement of sovereignty’s points of application took place in the seventeenth century. Because monarchical sovereignty hindered the development of a disciplinary society, sovereignty was re-articulated as popular sovereignty and codified in a system of rights of the individual. This “democratization of sovereignty” facilitated the establishment of disciplinary power against monarchy at the same time as it concealed mechanisms of control, “to the extent that they were the mode in which power was actually exercised,” behind a system of rights (Foucault 2004, 37). A second displacement occurred in response to the totalizing mechanisms of the power over life which Foucault describes as a “biopolitics of the population” (Foucault 1990, 139). These historical shifts required a continuous repositioning of sovereignty through which the awesome power of the sovereign was preserved as the state’s right to kill, subjected to a biopolitical rationality and deployed for the protection of the life and salvation of the population. In the name of the defense of the people, its enemies have to be killed not because they are “adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population” (Foucault 2004, 256). In modernity, sovereignty is invoked and exploited for biopolitical purposes within the context of a wider governmental regime. Because its justification depends on another type of power, sovereignty is far from being pure, self-grounding or supreme.

IV.2 The double-bind of sovereignty: Etienne Balibar and Jacques Derrida

In a way similar to Foucault and partly against Agamben’s demand for a non-sovereign politics, Etienne Balibar and Jacques Derrida have cautioned against an all too reductive understanding of sovereignty and a wholesale dismissal of the concept.
Balibar criticizes the common but overly simplistic identification of national and popular sovereignty as well as the crude distinction between national and post-national politics and its concomitant opposition of the sovereign nation state and its demise. In order to correct the limitations of such narratives, he calls for a genealogy of sovereignty that investigates not only “what becomes of sovereignty under conditions of crisis or a transformation of the political, but also the formation of its concept, that is to say, the tensions, the oppositions it contains” (Balibar 2000, 49; my translation). For this purpose, Balibar turns to Bodin and Hobbes who, he claims, inscribe sovereignty within a “diagram of power” constituted by the “marks” of sovereignty which give sovereignty its indivisibility while at the same time marking its applicability to distinct spheres of public and private life (Balibar 2000, 60; my translation). Balibar contends that this doctrine of the marks of sovereignty indicates not only what is covered by the absoluteness and indivisibility of classical sovereignty but also that which it lacks. As is particularly obvious in the control of the sphere of conscience and the economy, the autonomy of the political can only be achieved by means of a politicization of extra-political domains undertaken by the state. Because the process by which this autonomy is sought to be achieved is, for Balibar, “never more than a tendential process, essentially unfinished, facing obstacles that prohibit its full realization,” Balibar concludes that the accomplishment of sovereignty, too, remains an “unfinished, indeed ‘impossible’ task” (Balibar 2000, 66; my translation).

Balibar’s notion of the impossibility of fully realizing sovereignty due to its inherent tensions is taken up and elaborated upon by Jacques Derrida, albeit in different terms. The double-bind invoked by Balibar becomes the “autoimmunity of sovereignty” in the work of Derrida (Derrida 2005, 88). Based on his reading of Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, Derrida argues that sovereignty is, first and foremost, the artificial product of human creation. As such, “it is deconstructible, it is historical; and as historical, subject to infinite transformation, it is at once precarious, mortal and perfectible” (Derrida 2009, 27). Derrida therefore argues that it would be “imprudent,” “hasty” and “hardly reasonable” to unconditionally reject and oppose sovereignty as such because by doing so one would thereby also and inevitably oppose “the classical principles of freedom and self-determination” (Derrida 2005, 158). Arguing that sovereignty is indispensable for any conception of selfhood or ipseity before applying to the state, the nation-state, the monarch or the people, Derrida maintains that “There is no freedom without ipseity and, vice versa, no ipseity without freedom – and, thus, without a
certain sovereignty” (Derrida 2005, 23). While Derrida thus holds on to sovereignty as the condition of possibility of freedom, he nevertheless demands that we “call into question” and “limit a logic of nation-state sovereignty,” that we “erode not only its principle of indivisibility but its right to the exception, its right to suspend rights and law, along with the undeniable ontotheology that founds it” (Derrida 2005, 157). This challenging of sovereignty is not only “some formal or academic necessity for a kind of speculation in political philosophy, or else a form of genealogical, or perhaps even deconstructive, vigilance” but rather a task – an infinite and impossible task – imposed by the practical reality and actual exercise of sovereignty (Derrida 2005, 157).

IV.3 The complexities of sovereignty: Butler, Brown, Connolly, Agnew

The practical considerations invoked by Derrida have recently led a number of scholars, particularly and certainly not without reason American political theorists, to mobilize the framework provided by contemporary continental political philosophy for a serious rethinking of sovereignty. While a complete analysis of the similarities and differences as well as the strengths and weaknesses of these accounts is beyond the scope of this article, I shall review, by way of conclusion, what I see as the most fruitful conceptualizations for an adequate and productive engagement with sovereignty today.

Trying to make sense of the power relations that make possible the practice of indefinite detention in the War on Terror, Judith Butler draws from Foucault to account for the anachronistic resurgence of sovereignty under conditions of modern governmentality. She insists on the distinction between sovereignty and biopolitics and claims that it is possible to think a coexistence of both these forms of power. Yet Butler also suggests that within a field of governmentality, sovereignty is transformed and used as a tactic. This tactic is used in the interests of the state, for example, in the practice of indefinite detention. In indefinite detention, state officials are given the power to decide who is and who is not to be tried according to national, military and international legal frameworks. While these “managerial officials with no clear claim to legitimacy” belong to a governmental system, their exercise of the power “to ‘deem’ someone dangerous and constitute them effectively as such, is a sovereign power, a ghostly and forceful resurgence of sovereignty in the midst of governmentality” (Butler 2004, 59). For Butler, these officials are, therefore, part of a
governmental apparatus and yet they are “petty sovereigns,” wielders of a “spectral sovereignty” which is used instrumentally to suspend or tactically deploy law for the surveillance, detention and regulation of populations (Butler 2004, 61). This new sovereignty is not self-grounding and, therefore, not sovereignty in the traditional sense of the term. Instead, “Governmentality is the condition of this new exercise of sovereignty in the sense that it first establishes law as a ‘tactic,’ something of instrumental value, and not ‘binding’ by virtue of its status as law” (Butler 2004, 62). On this view, sovereignty appears not as the cause but as the effect of the suspension of law which is itself driven by security interests. For Butler, it is “precisely because our historical situation is marked by governmentality, and this implies, to a certain degree, a loss of sovereignty, that loss is compensated through the resurgence of sovereignty within the field of governmentality” and through the creation of sovereignty through the suspension of a law that is no longer binding but rather seen as a more or less useful tactic (Butler 2004, 56).

For Wendy Brown, the most striking manifestation of such a compensation of waning nation-state sovereignty are the walls being built along state borders (for example between the United States and Mexico, Israel and the West Bank, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Kashmir or Saudi-Arabia, Yemen and Iraq) and within states or cities (like the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco, walled neighborhoods in Baghdad or gated communities in the Southwestern United States). On Brown’s reading, all these walls and fences appear as attempts to assert and preserve sovereignty against complex globalized networks of capillary power. Contending that “key characteristics of sovereignty are migrating from the nation-state to the unrelieved domination of capital and God-sanctioned political violence,” Brown argues that it is precisely this “detachment of sovereignty from the nation-state, that is generating much of the frenzy of nation-state wall building today” (Brown 2010, 23-24). However, because for Brown sovereignty in the traditional sense “has always been somewhat of a fiction,” walls merely cover over the essential lack of what is presented as supreme, perpetual and absolute power (Brown 2010, 22). In other words, walls reflect the double-bind of sovereignty by performatively shoring up a power that is impossible to realize, thereby compensating while at the same time evincing sovereignty’s disintegration. The more general implication of Brown’s analysis of the practice of walling is that any theorization of sovereignty needs to take into account “the contemporary coming apart of sovereignty and nation-states” (Brown 2010, 66).
The most convincing attempts to incorporate the dissociation of sovereignty and state into a theoretical framework of sovereignty have been developed under the banners of “sovereign practices” and “sovereignty regimes.” William Connolly focuses on “the actual practice of state sovereignty” with respect to its “sites of action,” triggered largely by the expansion and transformation of capitalism (Connolly 2011, 130). Ultimately, Connolly maintains, sovereignty is “an essentially ambiguous and shifting practice” whose complexities demand a mode of analysis able to account for “pervasive tendencies and pressures that, because they are embedded within and between the state, markets, family, church, occupational organizations, and civil servants, set both the larger conscious context of decision and the unconscious background of the thinkable and tolerable” (Connolly 2011, 131).

While the dependence of sovereign practices on globalization, capital and religion leads Connolly to understand the contemporary global condition in terms of a “world resonance machine of antagonistic forces” (Connolly 2011, 14), the political geographer John Agnew has introduced the notion of “sovereignty regimes” in order to conceptualize the different modes in which sovereignty actually operates in the world (Agnew 2009, vii). Based on actual manifestations of sovereignty and a geographical approach, Agnew lays out a “framework for understanding sovereignty in terms of a set of ‘regimes’” which is organized around the variable relation between centralized state power and the territory to which it applies (Agnew 2009, 98). This approach allows Agnew to account for different modes of sovereignty manifest in different relationships of authority and control with regard to its territoriality. Speaking in ideal-types, Agnew distinguishes classic (strong centralized power exercised within a defined state territory like in China), imperialist (no central state authority but external dependence combined with a constant challenging of territoriality such as in sub-Saharan Africa), integrative (co-existence of different tiers of authority with complex territorial demarcations like the European Union) and globalist (a strong central state authority that exercises power globally and co-opts other states into its strategies such as the United States). Since states can exhibit any number of these regimes simultaneously – for instance, the US deploy classic sovereignty domestically while pursuing globalist sovereignty externally – Agnew contends that these sovereignty regimes have to be understood as ideal-types. Because they are “relational forms in which sovereignty in a particular case is always established in relation to other states and actors,” it is clear for
Agnew that an adequate understanding of sovereignty presupposes “pluralism rather than … a single model for the whole world” (Agnew 2009, 135).

What unites the authors discussed in this section is an attempt to theorize the complexities of sovereignty and the premise that sovereignty understood as absolute, supreme and indivisible power is a fiction. The consequence, in Brown’s words, is that in a context of globalization and transnational capital this fiction has “ceased to be an operative or convincing” one (Brown 2010, 67). It might be worth considering that many of the challenges posed to contemporary political theory and practice result from the fact that sovereignty remains operative precisely as a fiction. Because of the responsiveness of sovereign practices to changes in a wider social, economic and cultural context, any theoretical determination of the concept of sovereignty has to remain unfinished if it wants to account adequately for political reality.


3 Strictly speaking, Schmitt defines the sovereign not as a particular entity with the additional power to decide on the state of exception. Rather, whoever decides de facto is sovereign. The imprecise translation of the German text further obscures Schmitt’s notoriously difficult thought. The German “über den Ausnahmestatus entscheiden” entails the decision on in the state of exception. That is to say, sovereign is whoever decides not only whether or not a state of exception exists but also what is to be done in a state of exception. See also McCormick, John P. “The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency Powers.” In Law as Politics. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, edited by David Dyzenhaus, 217-251. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.


In particular, Derrida has in mind Hobbes’ account of man’s imitation of nature, i.e. “the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World,” in his creation of the commonwealth as well as the analogy Hobbes draws between the human body and the body of Leviathan as “Artificiall Man” (Hobbes 2003, 9).

Works cited


As will become clear in the following section, Agamben here positions himself against Foucault’s distinction between sovereignty and biopower. While for Foucault the emergence of a biopolitical concern with life determines a society’s “threshold of modernity” (Foucault 1990, 143), Agamben identifies the “production of a biopolitical body [as] the originary activity of sovereign power” (Agamben 1998, 6).


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To put it another way, while the nation-state solves the problem of “governing the limits of power” (Foucault 1975, 131), the conflict of the nation-state—state sovereignty versus biopower—becomes a problem of how to “govern the limits of life” (Foucault 1975, 131). A nation-state may “govern” the limits of power by exercising sovereignty over its people, but this sovereignty is simultaneously “born” as “lifeworld” in the biopolitical context of the nation-state. In this context, sovereignty and biopower intersect as the “threshold of modernity” (Foucault 1975, 131).


———. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Trans. George Schwab.


